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Winter 2016
ISSN 0890-913X
Volume 31, Number 4

Political Property Rights and Governance Outcomes: A Theory of the Corporate Polity

Alexander William Salter, Texas Tech University
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/index.php?action=ajax&rs=GDMgetPage&rsargs[]=2016 Journal of Private Enterprise vol 31 no 4 Winter parte1.pdf&rsargs[]=0
TheJournalofPrivateEnterprise31(4),2016,120PoliticalPropertyRightsandGovernanceOutcomes:ATheoryoftheCorporatePolityAlexanderWilliamSalterTexasTechUniversity______________________________________________________AbstractIpresentatheoryofpoliticalpropertyrightsthatcomplementsfamiliarTieboutmechanismsinexplaininggovernanceoutcomes.Iarguethatwhenthestructureofpoliticalpropertyrightsissuchthatthepolitymostcloselyresemblesacorporation,governancewillbelargelyproductive.Incontrast,whenthestructureofpoliticalpropertyrightsissuchthatthepolityischaracterizedbyatragedyofthecommons,governancewillbelargelypredatoryandwillpromoterentseeking.Iillustratemytheorywithreferencetotwocorporate-likepolities,SingaporeandtheUnitedArabEmirates,aswellastheliteratureonprivatecityplanningonurbandevelopment.Ialsodiscusstheassumptionstowhichmyanalysisissensitive.Iconcludebyexploringpossiblefuturetrendsingovernanceinlightofmytheory.______________________________________________________JELCodes:D72,H11,H77,P14,P16Keywords:politicalpropertyrights,predatorygovernance,privategovernance,productivegovernanceI.IntroductionThispaperdevelopsatheoryofincentivealignmentinformalgovernanceinstitutionsbasedonthestructureofpoliticalpropertyrights.Italsoexploreshowthisstructureaffectsthequalityofgovernanceasperceivedbyarepresentativepolitydweller.Bycombiningfactormobility(Tiebout1956)withwell-alignedpoliticalpropertyrights,Iarriveatapowerfulincentive-alignmentmechanismforrulers.Idefineapoliticalpropertyrightasonethatguaranteesanindividualoragrouptherighttoparticipateinpoliticaldecisionmakingandaclaimtotherevenuesgeneratedtherefrom(see,e.g.,Salter2014).DifferingpoliticalpropertyrightsstructuresincentivizeIthankFrankStephenson,ShrutiRajagopalan,andtwoanonymousrefereesforhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft.Allremainingerrorsaremyown.
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