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Winter 2016
ISSN 0890-913X
Volume 31, Number 4

The Pitfalls of Legislative and Executive Policymaking Compared to Judge-Made Law

Slavisa Tasic, University of Mary
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/index.php?action=ajax&rs=GDMgetPage&rsargs[]=2016 Journal of Private Enterprise vol 31 no 4 Winter parte3.pdf&rsargs[]=0
TheJournalofPrivateEnterprise31(4),2016,4363ThePitfallsofLegislativeandExecutivePolicymakingComparedtoJudge-MadeLawSlavisaTasicUniversityofMary______________________________________________________AbstractThisarticleusesinsightsfromcognitivepsychologytocontrastjudge-madelawwithlegislativeandexecutivepolicymaking.Iarguethatthepredominantnarrowconceptionsofreasonandrationalityhaveledtooverlyoptimisticviewsofdeliberatepolicymakingattheexpenseoftraditionaljudge-madelaw.However,alternativeviewsofwhatconstitutesrationalitysuggestthatjudge-madelawmayhavesomeoftenoverlookedadvantagesoverdeliberatepolicymaking.______________________________________________________JELCodes:K1,D72,D80Keywords:rules,judiciary,experts,heuristics,ecologicalrationalityI.IntroductionTheliteratureontheputativeeconomicadvantagesofcommonlawovercivillawissubstantial.Anumberofauthorshavearguedthattheinstitutionaladvantagesofcommonlawstemfromthedifferentstructuresofgovernmentthatarecharacteristicofdifferentlegalframeworks.Themainsourceofthesuperioreconomicperformanceofcommonlawsystems,inthisview,isthegreaterindependencethatcommonlawjudgesenjoy(Hayek1960;Merryman1996;GlaeserandShleifer2002;KlermanandMahoney2007).Whilebothcommonlawandcivillawjudgesmayenjoynominalindependencefromgovernmentintermsofsecurityofappointmentandsalary,commonlawjudgesalsohavesubstantialbehavioralindependenceassociatedwiththeirlawmakingpower.Theweakerjudicialprotectionincivillawcountriestranslatesinto,onaverage,moreinterventionistgovernment,morebureaucracy,heavierregulation,andlesssecurepropertyrightsand,therefore,inferioreconomicperformance.Adifferentkindofargumentinfavorofcommonlawpointstothenatureofthelawitself,andinparticulartheadaptabilityofcommonlawontheonehandandtherigidityofcivillawontheother.Posner(1973)makesthecaseforcommonlawbyarguingthat
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