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Summer 2016
ISSN 0890-913X
Volume 31, Number 2

Market-Provided National Defense: Reply to Newhard

Peter T. Leeson, George Mason University
Christopher J. Coyne, George Mason University
Thomas K. Duncan, Radford University
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Market-ProvidedNationalDefense:ReplytoNewhardPeterT.LeesonGeorgeMasonUniversityChristopherJ.CoyneGeorgeMasonUniversityTheJournalofPrivateEnterprise31(2),2016,8386ThomasK.DuncanRadfordUniversity______________________________________________________AbstractNewhard(2016)challengesourargument,accordingtowhichtheinefficiencyofmarket-providednationaldefenseisanempiricalquestionratherthanalogicalimplicationofthefactthatprivatelyprovidednationaldefenseconfrontsafree-riderproblem.Weshowthathisargumentholdsonlyundertheassumptionthatprivatecontributionstopublicgoodsdependexclusivelyonthematerialbenefitsindividualsexpecttoreapfromsuchcontributions.Empirically,thisassumptionisfalse.Whenprivatecontributionstopublicgoodsdonotdependexclusivelyonthematerialbenefitsindividualsexpecttoreapfromsuchcontributions,theefficiencyorinefficiencyofmarket-providednationaldefenseis,asourargumentmaintained,an(unanswered)empiricalquestion.______________________________________________________JELCodes:F52,H10,H40Keywords:nationaldefense,free-riderproblem,anarchyI.IntroductionInapreviousissueofthisjournal,wearguedthatthefree-riderproblemassociatedwiththeprivateprovisionofnationaldefensedoesnot,ipsofacto,implytheinefficiencyofprivatelyprovidednationaldefense,asisconventionallyasserted(Leeson,Coyne,andDuncan2014).Nationaloffensealsosuffersfromafree-riderprobleminthatonenationsaggressiveactivitiesgeneratenonexcludablebenefitsforothernations.Becausetheefficientlevelofdefensedependsonthelevelofoffenseasocietyconfronts,whetherornotmarketsunderprovidedefensedependsontheseverityofthefree-riderprobleminitsproduction,andthus
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