1. Show or hide comments about the document.

  2. Search over the document's text.

  3. Share the document through social networks or e-mail.

  4. After selecting an area on the page.

  5. ...you can:
    copy the text
    share the segment
    comment
    cite the document

Winter 2018
ISSN 0890-913X
Volume 33, Number 4

Liberalizing Rent-Seeking: How Export Processing Zones Can Save or Sink an Economy

Lotta Moberg, William Blair
Download Share e-mail
  • << Back to editing
  • Previous version by
  • << Older
  • Newer >>
  • Revert to this one
  • Edit
  • Fullscreen
  • Show comments
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  • Zoom:
     
     
  • Page:  / 29
  •  
  •  
  •  
  • Line spacing:
     
     
  • Word spacing:
     
     
  • Search:FindClose
 
search results
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432
648
1
0
/index.php?action=ajax&rs=GDMgetPage&rsargs[]=2018 Journal of Private Enterprise Vol 33 No 4 Winter parte4.pdf&rsargs[]=0
TheJournalofPrivateEnterprise33(4),2018,6189LiberalizingRent-Seeking:HowExportProcessingZonesCanSaveorSinkanEconomyLottaMoberg*WilliamBlair______________________________________________________AbstractThispaperpresentsexportprocessingzones(EPZs)asarent-seekingtoolwiththeappearanceofadevelopmentpolicy.Mymodelofendogenoustariffformationillustrateshowinterestgroupslobbyfororagainstprotectionism,whichprovidesrentsforthegovernment.EPZsareawaytoliberalizetheeconomywhilepreservingsomeoftheserents.Theyarethereforebeneficialiftheirpoliticalalternativeismoreprotectionism.ThemodelindicatesthatEPZsdonotbenefitaneconomyviabackwardlinkagesbutthroughmarginalimprovementstoacountrystraderegime.AcasestudyoftheEPZsintheDominicanRepublicconfirmsthetheoreticaldiscussions.______________________________________________________JELCodes:D72,F13,P26,O24,O25Keywords:specialeconomiczones,rent-seeking,politicaleconomy,exportpromotion,exportprocessingzonesI.IntroductionMosteconomistsseerent-seekingaswasteful(Buchanan1980,p.359;Tullock2005,p.9).Lobbyingbybusinessestoinfluencegovernmentpolicyisanunproductiveactivity,butpolicymakersencourageitbecausetheybenefitfromtherent-seeking(HillmanandSchnytzer1986;Haber2002;Rose-Ackerman2006;Nye2009;Buchanan,Tollison,andTullock1980;AcemogluandRobinson2000,2012,p.84,chap.8).Acontrastingviewofrent-seekingisthatitcanactuallyoffereconomicbenefits.Itcan,forinstance,encouragetheprovisionofpublicgoods(Cowen,Glazer,andMcMillan1994)orincreasethewealthofacountrywhenitsgovernmentengagesintradeprotectionism(Bhagwati1980;BhagwatiandSrinivasan1980).Thispaperextendstheinsightthatrent-seekingcanbebeneficialby*IthankTylerCowen,RichardE.Wagner,GarettJones,MarkKoyama,A.ChristopherLimnios,andTomW.Bellforinvaluablecontributionstothisarticle.
GLIFOS-digital_archive