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Fall 2009
ISSN 0890-913X
Volume 25, Number 1

U.S. Airline Antitrust Policy and Empty Core Disequilibrium

Thomas Tacker, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
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TheJournalofPrivateEnterprise25(1),2009,69-79U.S.AirlineAntitrustPolicyandEmptyCoreDisequilibriumThomasTackerEmbryRiddleAeronauticalUniversityAbstractTheconceptofanemptycoreisappliedtobetterunderstandtheUSairlineindustryandhowanti-trustpolicymightbestbealteredtohelptheindustryperformbetterforbothconsumersandinvestors.Horrendousfinanciallossesoverthelongtermsuggestanemptycoreandpointtolikelyincreasesinfutureindustryconcentration.Theseandotherrelatedproblemsmightbesolvedbyallowingcompetingairlinestomorefreelyformalliances.Theindustryshistoryofincrediblyintensecompetitionsuggeststhatanyproblematictendencytoturnefficientcooperationintoinefficientcollusionmightwellbepreventedbynaturalrivalries.JELCodes:L93,L1,L2Keywords:Airlinecompetition;Emptycore;AntitrustI.IntroductionThedismalfinancialperformanceoftheU.S.legacyairlines,themajorhubandspokenetworkcarriers,isextraordinary.EvenbeforeallthebankruptciesfromtheproblemsofterroristattacksofSeptember11,2001,andsubsequentsurgingfuelcosts,returnsfortheairlineswereatthebottomofthecharts.Table1showslongrunratesofreturnforairlinestocksversustheS&P500andtheDowJonesIndustrials.(Thesefourwerethelegacycarriersthatavoidedbankruptcyintheperioddepicted.)So,forexample,investorswhoboughtallfourairlinestocksatthestartof1980andsubsequentlysoldthemonAugust31,2001,earnedareturnof333percent,aboutathirdofthereturnfortheS&P500ortheDow.Butthatwasacomparativelygoodperiodfortheairlines!1Byanydefinitionthisindustryhasnevercomecloseto1Inmanycases,ofcourse,thesesortsofratesofreturnareverysensitivetoparticularbuy/selldates.However,asthesefiguressuggest,thatwasnotatallthecasewiththeairlines.Basically,therewasnolongrunperiodinwhichanylegacyairlineperformedaswellasanycommonstockindex.Profitswerebetter,though69
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