The content of this website is availableunder Creative Commons LicenseAttribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported
  1. Show or hide comments about the document.

  2. Search over the document's text.

  3. Share the document through social networks or e-mail.

  4. After selecting an area on the page.

  5. ...you can:
    copy the text
    share the segment
    comment
    cite the document

Spring 2009
ISSN 0890-913X
Volume 24, Number 2

Spatially Targeted Government Spending and Heterogeneous Constituent Cost Shares

John Charles Bradbury, Kennesaw State University
E. Frank Stephenson, Berry College
Download Share e-mail
  • << Back to editing
  • Previous version by
  • << Older
  • Newer >>
  • Revert to this one
  • Edit
  • Fullscreen
  • Show comments
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  • Zoom:
     
     
  • Page:  / 12
  •  
  •  
  •  
  • Line spacing:
     
     
  • Word spacing:
     
     
  • Search:FindClose
 
search results
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
612
792
1
0
/jpe/index.php?action=ajax&rs=GDMgetPage&rsargs[]=Spring2009 6.pdf&rsargs[]=0
TheJournalofPrivateEnterprise24(2),2009,75-86SpatiallyTargetedGovernmentSpendingandHeterogeneousConstituentCostSharesJohnCharlesBradbury*KennesawStateUniversityE.FrankStephensonBerryCollegeAbstractThelawof1/n(Weingast,Shepsle,andJohnsen,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,1981)positsapositiverelationshipbetweenthesizeofanelectedbodyandgovernmentspendingbecausethetaxpayersineachdistrictbearonly1/nthofthetotaltaxburden.Relyingonvariationinthenumberofseatsinelectivebodies,evidencesupportiveofthelawof1/nhasbeenfoundatalllevelsofrepresentativegovernment.Itispossible,however,thatthesefindingssufferfromendogeneitybias:Politiespreferringlargergovernmentspendingmayalsoprefertohavemoreelectedofficials.Inthispaper,weproposeanalternativetestofthelawof1/n.Inadditiontopostulatingthatlargerelectivebodieswillhavehigherlevelsofgovernmentspending,thelawof1/nalsoimpliesthat,ceterisparibus,therewillbeanegativerelationshipbetweenlocallytargetedgovernmentspendingandajurisdictionsshareofthetaxationrequiredtofinancethespending.Wetestthispredictionbyexaminingtherelationshipbetweenspatiallytargetedgovernmentspendingandthetaxburdenacrossstates.Wefindanegativerelationshipbetweenlocaltaxcontributionstothecommontaxbaseandlocallytargetedgovernmentspendingforaggregatelocallytargetedspendingandforsixofeightsubcategories.Thesefindingsarerobusttotheinclusionofothervariablesthoughttoinfluencethedistributionofspendingonparochialprojects.JELCodes:D72,H11,H50Keywords:Lawof1/n;Representativegovernment;Publicexpenditure;Fiscalcommons*Wethanktheanonymousrefereesandparticipantsatthe2003PublicChoiceSocietymeetingsforhelpfulsuggestions.75
GLIFOS-digital_archive